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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The current procurement system for asphalt pavement used by the
Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) utilizes a competitive sealed proposal
with the contract awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. Cost control
continues to play a fundamental role throughout the pavement construction
process. The contractor purchases materials from a supplier, who is also often
the lowest bidder. As paving materials move through the contractor’s equipment,
binder and aggregate are tested by the contractor, by NDOR personnel and/or by
independent quality control technicians. Deficiencies in workmanship or material
quality result in monetary penalties levied against the contractor. The contractor
often passes these penalties onward to the material supplier.
NDOR currently has in-place a system of incentives to reimburse
contractors for pavement quality based upon indices measured at completion of
construction. For asphalt pavement, problems resulting from materials or
construction techniques used often do not become apparent until one to three
years after construction has been completed. The system currently used by the
NDOR lacks incentives to encourage use of materials or construction techniques
which might significantly improve the long-term quality of asphalt pavement.
This research investigated the advantages of creating a system of
incentives to reward contractors for producing asphalt pavement with good longterm (one to three years) performance characteristics. It evaluated several
pavement performance indices to determine which were most reflective of longterm asphalt pavement performance and examined the concept of awarding
specific monetary incentives to pavement contractors based upon levels of
performance indicators at various points during pavement lifespan.
This research also analyzed various existing and experimental incentive
programs, with the objective of developing one or more performance-based
incentives that the NDOR could use for contractors providing asphalt pavement
to the State of Nebraska. Since the NDOR already has an incentive system
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keyed to specific indices measured immediately after completion of construction,
the proposed incentive program is based upon indices measured later in
pavement life. Various quality indices (International Roughness Index, rutting,
cracking, etc.) measured annually by the NDOR were evaluated for their potential
to serve as indicators of pavement quality one to three years after construction.
The performance incentive system proposed allows contractors to receive full
contract payment for pavement built to construction specifications. The system
will subsequently provide an additional monetary incentive at a specified interval
to contractors who produce pavement that continues to meet or exceed
established quality standards.
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CHAPTER 2
INFORMATION SEARCH
Performance measures consist of assessment data that strongly, directly,
or quantitatively reflect the degree to which specific results meet the needs and
expectations of the customer. These measures are often compared to goals or
benchmarks, so remedial actions can be initiated when benchmarks are not
being met. Performance indicators, on the other hand, are data that suggest
general alignment of results with customer goals. Indicators are typically direct or
surrogate measures for the actual performance characteristics of interest.
Indicators can be useful in identifying trends in overall performance, as well as
for actual comparison to a desired goal. Performance measures can be
aggregated from local to state to regional to national levels. Some performance
measures may even at allow an agency to be compared with other agencies, if a
measure based on cost is used (Richter 2004).

2.1 How Does the NDOR Measure Pavement Quality?
The NDOR measures quality of asphalt pavement by the use of means
and method specifications, the application of quality assurance specifications and
through NDOR evaluations of quality at the completion of construction. Quality of
asphalt pavement is not measured by NDOR through performance related
specifications or warranties (OPA 2006).
The NDOR conducts almost continuous assessment of quality throughout
the lifetime of a pavement. Numerous indicators are measured and recorded
annually for each section of highway throughout the network.

The NDOR’s

Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway Construction (2007) lists
some of these indicators including:
Roughness (IRI): The roughness or International Roughness Index (IRI) is a
measure of pavement smoothness commonly recorded in vertical millimeters per
lateral meter.
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Cracking Index: This is a rating value expressed as a percentage, which is used
to quantify the amount of cracking based on the severity and extent noted during
a visual inspection.
Transverse Cracking: The transverse/thermal-cracking index is expressed as an
index on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the best condition and 100 the worst.
The index reflects the severity and extent of transverse cracking on a bituminous
pavement.
Rutting: The average rut depth of both wheel paths measured with a pavement
profiler commonly recorded in millimeters. Rutting is characteristic of bituminous
pavements.
PSI: The Present Serviceability Index or PSI. This is a numerical value indicating
the ride quality of the pavement. PSI is a function of roughness IRI, cracking, and
rutting. PSI is evaluated on a scale from 0 to 5, with 0 characterizing the worst
condition and 5 the best.
Current NSI: The Nebraska Serviceability Index is recorded as value on a scale
from 0 to 100, with 0 the worst and 100 the best condition. The number
represents the relative condition of the pavement at the time of measurement.
NSI is used to develop remaining years of pavement life.
Percent Joint Seal: A factor measured for concrete pavement denoting the extent
of joint seal failure at a sample site.
Faulting: The average displacement at the longitudinal and transverse joints,
commonly measured in millimeters.
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Specific indicators for particular pavement types falling below prescribed
levels trigger various repair or rehabilitation practices under the NDOR’s
pavement management plan (NDOR 2005).

2.2 Current NDOR Construction Incentives/Disincentives
Current NDOR quality incentive programs for pavement are based upon
pavement smoothness and quality of materials immediately after construction
has been completed. Smoothness provisions can be found in Section 502.08
and Section 1028 of the NDOR’s Supplemental and Standard Specifications for
Highway Construction. Examples of payment adjustment factors for smoothness
are illustrated in Table 1, while examples of payment adjustment factors for
materials and workmanship are shown in Tables 2-5.
If the initial profile index is 10.0 in/mi or less and bump removal is
required, a second profilogram is taken after the bumps are removed (Table 1).
The percent of pay for a profile index is then based upon the second profilogram
subject to the limitations that follow. If the initial profile index exceeds 7 in/mi,
then, except for total removal and replacement, the maximum percent of pay
after bump removal is limited to 100 percent. Percent of pay is based on a
second run of the profilogram after bump removal. The work of smoothness
testing is paid for at the lump sum unit price specified in the contract. This price is
considered to be full compensation for all smoothness testing as set forth in the
specification (NDOR 2007)
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Table 1 – The NDOR’s Payment Adjustment Schedule for Asphalt Pavement
Smoothness.

Payment Adjustment Schedule

Profile Index

Percent of

Inches Per Lane Mile

Contract Prices

0 to 2.0 inches

105.0

More than 2.0 to 4.0 inches

102.0

More than 4.0 to 5.0 inches

101.0

More than 5.0 to 7.0 inches

100.0

More than 7.0 to 8.0 inches

98.0

More than 8.0 to 9.0 inches

95.0

More than 9.0 to 10.0 inches

90.0

More than 10.0 inches

Corrective work required

(Source: Section 502 – Asphaltic Concrete Pavement Smoothness from NDOR Supplemental
and Standard Specifications for Highway Construction)

Pay factor for smoothness of the top layer of asphaltic concrete is
determined according to the following formula:
PF = A (1.05) + B (1.02) + C (1.01) + D (1.00) + E (0.98) + F (0.95) + G (0.90)
A+B+C+D+E+F+G
Where:
A = length of pavement with a profile index of 0 to 2.0
B = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 2.0 to 4.0
C = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 4.0 to 5.0
D = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 5.0 to 7.0
E = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 7.0 to 8.0
F = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 8.0 to 9.0
G = length of pavement with a profile index greater than 9.0 to 10.0
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Table 2 illustrates the NDOR’s pay factors for asphalt materials. Payment
is based upon the top layer of the driving lane asphalt cement and asphaltic
concrete. Plan thickness is adjusted according to the schedule and payment
criteria shown in Table 3. Adjustments are calculated based on 0.1 mile sections
measured by the profilograph (NDOR 2007).

Table 2 – The NDOR’s Pay Factors for Asphalt Materials
.
Asphalt Materials – Pay Factors
Pay Factor*
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.40 or Reject

Specified Property
Upper Limit
Lower Limit
+ 1% to 10%
Greater than +10% to
Less than -10% to -15%
+15%
Greater than +15% to
Less than -15% to -20%
+20%
Greater than +20% to
Less than -20% to -25%
+25%
Greater than +25% to
Less than -25% to -30%
+30%
Greater than +30%
Less than -30%

* If the resultant pay factor for the material is less than 0.70, the material shall be rejected if not already
used. If incorporated in any work which is judged to be unsatisfactory, the material shall also be rejected.
* If the pay factor is less than 0.70 and the material has been incorporated in work which is allowed to
remain in place, the pay factor for the material shall be 0.40.
(Source: Table 503.01 A Asphalt Materials – Pay Factors from NDOR Supplemental and Standard
Specifications for Highway Construction)
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Table 3 – The NDOR’s Applicable Properties for Asphalt Pavement

Applicable Properties
Asphalt Cement
Property

Asphaltic Oil

Emulsified Asphalt

Viscosity Penetration Original Distillation Original Distillation
Grade
Grade
Material
Residue
Material
Residue

Viscosity

X¹

Penetration

X

X
X¹

Distillation
to 435°F
Distillation
to 500°F
Distillation
to 600°F
Percent
Residue
Float
Test
Absolute
Viscosity
Softening
Point
¹ Original material and thin film residue.

X³
X

X
X²

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

² Penalties cannot be based on tests made on Residue by Evaporation.
³ No penalties will be assessed if more than 1 day has elapsed between the sampling
and the testing of the material.
(Source: Table 503.01B Applicable Properties from NDOR Supplemental and Standard
Specifications for Highway Construction)

Tables 4 and 5 illustrate specific NDOR material pay factors which can serve as
incentives or disincentives. Pay factors based upon pavement density attempt to
measure quality of both materials and workmanship (NDOR 2007).
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Table 4 – The NDOR’s Schedule for Acceptance - Density of Compacted
Asphaltic Concrete (First Lot)
Acceptance Schedule Density of Compacted
Asphaltic Concrete (First Lot)
Average Density (5 Samples,

Pay Factor

Percent of Voidless Density)
Greater than 90.0
Greater than 89.5 to 90.0
Greater than 89.0 to 89.5
89.0 or Less

1.00
0.95
0.70
0.40 or Reject

(Source: Table 1028.21 Acceptance Schedule Density of Compacted Asphaltic Concrete (First
Lot) from NDOR Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway Construction)

Table 5 – The NDOR’s Schedule for Acceptance - Density of Compacted
Asphaltic Concrete (Subsequent Lots)

Acceptance Schedule Density of Compacted Asphaltic
Concrete (Subsequent Lot)
Average Density (5 Samples,
Percent of Voidless Density)
Greater than 92.4
Greater than 91.9 to 92.4
Greater than 91.4 to 91.9
Greater than 90.9 to 91.4
Greater than 90.4 to 90.9
Greater than 89.9 to 90.4
89.9 or Less

Pay Factor
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.70
0.40 or Reject

(Source: Table 1028.22 Acceptance Schedule Density of Compacted Asphaltic Concrete
(Subsequent Lot) from NDOR Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway
Construction)
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2.3 The NDOR’s Incentive Program for Superpave Asphaltic Concrete
Acceptance and pay factors for Asphaltic Concrete Type SPS are based
on compacted in place average density.

Acceptance and pay factors for

Asphaltic Concrete Type SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4, SP4 Special and SP5 are based
on single test air voids, running average air voids, compacted in place average
density, and production tolerances pay factors (NDOR 2004).

Examples of

Superpave production tolerances and acceptance factors are shown in Tables 6
and 7.
When there is a production tolerance pay factor penalty, the penalty
percentage is subtracted from the percent pay for single test air voids for each
sublot affected. These three individual pay factors are then multiplied by each
other to determine a total pay factor for each sublot [(750 tons) (680 Mg)].
When any single test result on the same mix property from two
consecutive QC samples falls outside the allowable production tolerances of
Table 6, the material represented by these tests can either be accepted with a
20% penalty or rejected at the discretion of the project Engineer (NDOR 2004).

Table 6 – The NDOR’s Production Tolerances*

Test

Allowable Single Test
Deviation from Specification

Voids in the Mineral Aggregate

- 0.75% to + 1.25% from Min.

Dust to Asphalt Ratio

None

Coarse Aggregate Angularity

- 5% below Min.

Fine Aggregate Angularity

- 0.50% below Min.

*These tolerances are applied to the mix design specification values, not the
submitted mix design targets.
(Source: Table 1028.19 Production Tolerances of Superpave Asphaltic Concrete from Section
1028 of the NDOR’s Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway Construction,
revised 3-22-04)
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Table 7 – The NDOR’s Schedule for Acceptance - Asphaltic Concrete Air
Voids

Acceptance Schedule
Air Voids - Ndes
Air voids test results
Less than 1.5%
1.5% to less than 2.0%
2.0% to less than 2.5%
2.5% to less than 3.0%
3.0% to less than 3.5%
3.5% to 4.5%
Over 4.5% to 5.0%
Over 5.0% to 5.5%
Over 5.5% to 6.0%
Over 6.0% to 6.5%
Over 6.5% to 7.0%
Over 7.0%

Moving average of
four
Reject
Reject
50% or Reject
90%
100%
102%
100%
95%
90%
50% or Reject
Reject
Reject

Single test
Reject
50%
95%
95%
100%
104%
100%
95%
95%
90%
50%
Reject

(Source: Table 1028.20 Acceptance Schedule Air Voids - Ndes of Superpave Asphaltic Concrete
from section 1028 of the NDOR’s Supplemental and Standard Specifications for Highway
Construction, revised 3-22-04)
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2.4 Other Agency’s Construction Incentives/Disincentives
Although many proposed roles for performance standards go well beyond
current highway construction practices, performance standards for highway
construction are nothing new. Because pavement smoothness is widely
recognized as important from a standpoint of both user satisfaction (no one likes
to drive on a rough road) and long-term performance (smooth roads last longer
and are often of higher overall quality than rough roads), performance standards
for pavement smoothness have seen widespread use (Carpenter, et al. 2003).
Most highway agencies use smoothness specifications of one form or another.
These specifications establish target values for smoothness measured using
standard engineering test methods that are related to user perceptions. Many
agencies include incentives and/or disincentives to encourage achievement of
the high levels of smoothness that result in reduced operating costs for highway
users and reduced maintenance costs for the owner agencies. Current
performance standards for smoothness and the results obtained from specifying
performance standards are illustrated by examples from Arizona, Virginia, and
Kansas (Richter 2004).

Arizona
For new construction, Arizona has established a target International
Roughness Index (IRI) value of 41, with smoothness expressed in inches per
mile. Incentives are earned for values below 38 and disincentives are assessed
for values in excess of 48. For rehabilitation projects, the target, incentive, and
disincentive values vary as a function of highway type, the nature of the work to
be performed, and (in some cases) the smoothness of the existing pavement.
Target smoothness is 39 to 68, while the thresholds for incentives vary from 37 to
66 (target value minus 2) and the threshold for disincentives varies from 49 to 78
(target value plus 10).
Removal and replacement (as opposed to other corrective actions) is
required for smoothness values that exceed the target plus 45.
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In general,

typical pavement smoothness incentives paid by the Arizona DOT average
approximately $7,500 per lane mile or approximately $1.00 per square yard.
Average contractors in Arizona produce IRI smoothness values in the mid
thirties. Some very good contractors consistently achieve IRI smoothness values
in the low thirties, with substantial areas often in the twenties (Richter 2004).

Virginia
Virginia has smoothness provisions for new construction and maintenance
resurfacing, with smoothness expressed as IRI in inches per mile. For new
construction, 100% payment is awarded for an IRI between 55 and 70 inches/
mile. Bonus payments are earned for achieving IRI values less than 55
inches/mile and penalties are incurred for IRI values greater than 70 inches/mile,
to a maximum of zero payment at IRI values greater than 160 inches/mile.
Corrective action is required when the average IRI for a section exceeds 100
inches/mile (Richter 2004).
For maintenance resurfacing, a maximum 10 percent bonus based on the
asphaltic concrete (AC) surface cost is possible for interstate highway sections
with an IRI less than 45 inches/mile and for non-interstate roads with an IRI less
than 55 inches/mile. Additionally, full payment is reserved for interstates with IRI
from 55 to 70 inches/mile, while non-interstates must have an IRI between 65
and 80 inches/mile for full payment (Richter 2004).
Unlike new construction projects, most resurfacing projects are tested
prior to and after paving. These projects can be either a straight overlay or a milland-replace. Before-and-after testing is used to determine the amount of
improvement in ride quality. If the contractor is able to improve the quality by
more than 30%, the contractor is guaranteed full payment for smoothness.
For new construction, the contractor can receive an incentive of up to five
percent based on IRI results. The amount of the incentive is based the total
quantity of all asphaltic concrete used. Maintenance resurfacing contracts allow
up to a ten percent bonus. This amount is based on the cost of surface layers
only. (Richter 2004)
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Virginia has been actively using a ride special provision since the late
1990s. Most of the ride data have been collected on maintenance resurfacing
projects. With more than 150 projects in 2002, the average IRI on interstates was
60 inches/mile. For non-interstate routes, the average was 67 inches/mile on
U.S. routes and 74 inches/mile on State routes. Over the last six years, the
average IRI on the interstates has stabilized while ride quality on non-interstate
routes continues to improve (Richter 2004). Analysis of the 2003 ride quality is
currently being conducted.
In addition to improved ride quality, Virginia has seen other benefits
through use of performance based provisions. During the mix-design process,
contractors have developed mixes that better balance mix production costs and
level of construction effort to achieve good quality field placement. These custom
mixes result in better ride, better density, less tendency to segregate, less
permeability, and more liquid asphalt for durability. When the ride special
provision is applied on a project, more attention to detail is required throughout
the paving process. Use of a materials transfer vehicle, continuous feed of
material, no stopping of the paver, and proper rolling techniques are examples of
techniques employed to improve ride quality.

The use of the ride special

provision provides monetary incentives to the contractor and longer lasting
pavements for the taxpayer (Richter 2004).

Kansas
With smoothness expressed as profile index in millimeters/kilometer
(mm/km), Kansas specifications, in general, require an average profile index of
475 mm/km or less per 0.1 km section as measured with a California-type
profilograph. (Richter 2004). An exception is made for ramps and acceleration
and deceleration lanes. A profile index of 630 mm/km or less is required at these
locations. In addition, PCC pavement areas within each section having high
points with deviations greater than 7.5 mm and flexible pavement areas within
each section having high or low points with deviations greater than 10 mm in a
length of 7.5 meters are to be corrected regardless of the profile index. These
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efforts seem to be working, especially for asphalt pavement. Figure 1 shows a
historical summary of pavement smoothness in Kansas. Note the increase in
percentage of asphalt pavement with smoothness between 0 and 160 mm/km
between 1991 and 2001.

Figure 1 – Smoothness of New Pavement Constructed in Kansas 1990-2002
(Source: Richter 2004)
Pay adjustments are based on the average profile index determined for
the sections prior to any corrective work (such as grinding). If the contractor
elects to remove and replace the sections or overlay pavement to meet the
smoothness specification, pay adjustments are based on the average profile
index obtained after replacement or overlay. Table 8 shows the schedule used
to adjust payments for flexible pavement quality in Kansas.
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Table 8 – Kansas Schedule for Adjusted Payments – Flexible Pavements

Average Profile Index
(mm/km per lane per 0.1 km section)
110 or less
111 to 160
161 to 475
476 to 630

Contract Price Adjustment
(per 0.1 km section per lane)
+$100.00
+$50.00
0.00*
0.00*
(Source: Richter 2004)

* Correct to 475 mm/km (630 mm/km for ramps, acceleration and deceleration
lanes)
Although some fluctuation has occurred from year to year, Kansas has
seen a substantial increase in the percentage of pavements built with high levels
of smoothness (0 to 240 mm/km for PCC pavements and 0 to 160 mm/km for
flexible pavements).
2.5 Management of Long-Term Pavement Performance through Warranties
Warranty specifications are one type of performance specification that has
received more attention in recent years. When using warranty specifications, a
transportation agency specifies pavement performance only; the contractor must
warrant the performance of the pavement over a specific amount of time. This
warranty period normally extends two to seven years for asphalt pavements,
although some warranties have been written for periods up to twenty years for
concrete pavement.

During the warranty period, any defects attributable to

construction practices or materials are repaired at the contractor’s expense.
States that have used or are currently using pavement warranties are shown in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2 – Use of Pavement Warranties in the United States
(Source: www. fhwa.dot.gov.Pavement/warranty/background.doc
retrieved January 21, 2007)
There are two basic types of construction warranties, materials and
workmanship and performance.

A materials and workmanship warranty

addresses the quality of pavement immediately after construction while a
performance warranty addresses pavement quality at some point in time in the
future.

Performance warranties are typically referred to as a "warranty

specification" for pavements (WSDOT 2002).
Almost all HMA pavement construction is covered by a short duration
(usually one year) materials and workmanship warranty. This type of warranty
assigns risk to the contractor for following transportation agency specifications in
regards to materials and workmanship. If a problem or defect is detected within
the warranty period, the transportation agency usually uses some type of forensic
analysis to determine the cause.

If it is determined that specification non-

compliance caused the problem, the pavement is repaired at the contractor's
expense.

If unexpected traffic volume or changed conditions caused the
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problem, the transportation agency assumes financial responsibility for the repair
costs.

This type of warranty is almost universal, rarely collected on, and is

usually covered by sureties at no additional charge to the contractor.
A performance warranty assigns a longer portion of the pavement
performance risk to the contractor. During the warranty period, the transportation
agency continues to monitor pavement performance. Throughout the warranty
period, any performance below defined limits attributable to construction methods
or materials must be remedied at the contractor's expense.

Because the

contractor assumes greater risk, he/she is allowed to control most aspects of
construction.
For specifying transportation agencies, warranties represent progress over
end-result specifications because warranties enumerate specific standards for
actual pavement performance rather than material characteristics that are only
indicative of pavement performance. Table 9 shows an example of performance
standards developed by the Indiana DOT.

Warranty specifications are more

capable of aligning the sometimes competing influences of economic incentives,
innovation, customer requirements and pavement quality. This alignment, when
achieved, allows market forces and economics, rather than construction
specifications alone, to drive pavement quality (NCHRP 2001).

Table 9 - Indiana DOT Pavement Performance Thresholds for a Five Year
Warranty Specification
Parameter

Threshold Value (contractor must take
action above this value)

IRI

2.1 m/km (133 inches/mile)

Rut depth

9 mm (0.375 inches)

Surface Friction

average of 35 but no single section < 25

Transverse Cracking

Severity 2 (as defined by the Indiana DOT)

Longitudinal Cracking

5.5 m (18 ft.) per 152.5 m (500 ft.) section
(Source: Washington State DOT, 2002)
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Although warranty specifications are being used in other countries, most
notably in Western Europe, they are used only sparingly in the United States for
several reasons.

First, U.S. paving contractors have been very reluctant to

assume greater risk.

Second, the Federal Government places certain legal

restrictions on warranty use.

Third, performance testing requires further

development so methods are proven accurate and test results can be used to
legally invoke warranty clauses. Finally, the surety industry may have the largest
say in the extent to which performance based incentives will be adopted in the
United States. Transportation agencies commonly limit their risk by requiring a
contractor be bonded.

Bonding agencies may or may not be willing to accept

the risk associated with a two to seven year performance warranty. Sureties are
especially wary when contractors have little to no say in pavement design and no
control over post-construction pavement use (WSDOT 2002).
A few state highway agencies have used both asphalt concrete and
Portland cement concrete pavement warranties for many years. Under a
pavement-warranty specification, quality is measured by the actual performance
of the pavement as opposed to the properties of pavement materials and
methods of construction. Pavement warranties require the construction
contractor to guarantee the post-construction performance of the pavement. The
shifting of post-construction performance risk from a state highway agency to a
contractor is perceived to reduce premature pavement failures, reduce costs, and
increase pavement quality. However, for most contractors to feel comfortable
with assuming the increased risk associated with a pavement warranty, some
type of monetary incentive must be provided (TRB 2005a).
Some states that use pavement warranties have reported a reduction in
costs and an improvement in quality, while others have not. For example, the
Wisconsin DOT has reported a significant quality increase and overall cost
reduction through the use of five year performance warranties for asphalt
concrete pavements (TRB 2005a). However, an evaluation of three year
workmanship and materials warranties completed by the Colorado DOT showed
no discernible impact on quality or cost (TRB 2005a).
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2.6

Other

Initiatives

toward

Management

of

Long-Term

Pavement

Performance.
The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) currently uses
Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) contracting on a project-by-project basis. Currently,
the selection process is proactive towards the needs of each project rather than a
standard procedure based on a set of established guidelines. ODOT is
attempting to develop a process to assist the selection of I/D contract methods
with associated values and timeframes based on guidelines or standards that
have been developed within the construction industry. With the continued
evolution of using both insourced and outsourced project delivery at ODOT, the
I/D process needs to be flexible, encompassing a wide range of problems and
issues

associated

with

both

preliminary

engineering

and

construction

engineering. The implementation of such a process will require substantial
support and documentation. The information will need to be highly organized and
articulate the elements of cost, schedule, quality and public support associated
with a particular I/D clause (TRB 2004).
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) has used
various incentives in paving contracts for many years but reached no conclusion
as to whether incentives influence the quality or outcomes of a project. An
assessment of performance based contracting is currently examining the bidding
process, impacts on contractors and agency personnel and project outcomes.
This research will assist WSDOT in determining whether to increase or decrease
the use of performance incentives in WSDOT pavement contracts (TRB 2005b).
A research project is currently investigating the effectiveness of using
alternative contracting techniques on Florida Department of Transportation
(FDOT) construction projects. The research is comparing relevant performance
factors for traditional Design-Bid-Build projects with those of the following
alternative contracting techniques: A+B, Incentive/Disincentive, Design-Build, NoExcuse Bonus, CM at Risk, and Lump Sum. The comparison will include the
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overall delivery from concept to completion for each technique. The specific
performance measures to be considered are comparison of initial estimates,
contractors price proposal, final estimate, original contract time, final contract
time, project quality, overall value, and administrative costs. The desired
outcome of this research is a definitive statement on the applicability of
alternative contracting techniques on FDOT construction projects. Additionally,
this research is evaluating strategies intended to standardize the alternative
contracting techniques, including training opportunities (TRB 2006).
State departments of transportation are under increasing pressure to
reduce the duration and cost of highway construction projects. This pressure
stems from the desire to reduce traffic delays and other inconveniences to the
traveling public. To reduce the duration of construction projects, many state
highway agencies have turned to the use of time-related incentive and
disincentive contract provisions. A better understanding of the use of time-related
incentives and disincentives in highway construction contracts is needed.
Specifically, the following items require further research:
(1) The types of time-related incentive and disincentive contract provisions
used in highway construction contracts and the extent to which they are used.
(2) The success of time-related incentive and disincentive contract
provisions.
(3) Criteria used to determine when time-related incentive and disincentive
contract provisions are appropriate and criteria to select the most appropriate
provisions.
(4) Methods used to determine the dollar amount of the time-related
incentives and disincentives.
(5) The effects of time-related incentives and disincentives on project
completion. The objective of this research is to develop recommendations for
effective use of time-related incentive and disincentive provisions in highway
construction contracts (TRB 2005c).
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS
According to the National Cooperative Highway Research Program, true
"performance-related standards":
•

are based on properties of the finished product, not on the processes used
to produce it;

•

consider the variability inherent in the finished product and in the testing
processes;

•

are based on attributes that have been related to the actual performance
of the product through validated quantitative models;

•

incorporate sampling and testing procedures whose combined costs are
consistent with the importance of the quality benefit being sought; and

•

make the contractor's payment dependent on how close the product
comes to the level of acceptable quality (Volokh 1996).

3.1 Proposed Pavement Performance Incentive Program
Parameters used to measure the quality of long-term pavement
performance must be understood by both construction personnel and the
NDOR’s quality control technicians. Guidelines with regard to which parameters
should be evaluated for inclusion in the NDOR’s performance-based incentive
program included the following:
•

Parameters should be one or more of those performance indicators
currently being measured by the NDOR. The NDOR measures a variety
of performance indicators including various cracking indices, IRI, PSI, NSI,
etc.

•

Parameters must correlate to an acceptable level of pavement
performance at the time when the incentive will be assessed.
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The research team originally proposed two sets of parameters, one for
conventional flexible pavement and the other for Superpave, as shown in Table
10. Table 10 was subsequently discussed with representatives from Dobson
Brothers, Hawkins and Werner Construction at the University of Nebraska on
November 17, 2006.

Table 10 – Initial Performance-Based Incentives Proposed for Asphalt
Pavement

Asphalt
(Traditional)

Eligibility Criteria

Incentive Parameter

Payment - % of
Contract

Profile Index ≤ 8 inches/mile

IRI ≤ 1.00 mm/m @ 2 yrs
IRI ≤ 1.2 mm/m @ 4 yrs

2.5 % @ 2 yrs
2.5 % @ 4 yrs

Rutting ≤ 4 mm @ 2 yrs
Rutting ≤ 4 mm @ 4 yrs

2.5 % @ 2 yrs
2.5 % @ 4 yrs

IRI ≤ 1.00 mm/m @ 2 yrs
IRI ≤ 1.2 mm/m @ 4 yrs

2.5 % @ 2 yrs
2.5 % @ 4 yrs

Rutting ≤ 4 mm @ 2 yrs
Rutting ≤ 4 mm @ 4 yrs

2.5 % @ 2 yrs
2.5 % @ 4 yrs

Variance of asphalt binder content
from design content (%) ≤ 0.25
Asphalt
(Superpave)

Dynamic Shear(Original) ≥ 0.89 KPa
Dynamic Shear (Residue) ≥ 1.95
KPa
Creep Stiffness ≤ 315 MPa
Creep Slope ≥ 0.291
Elastic Recovery ≥ 54 %

Comments from the contractor representatives included:
a. Four or five years is too long for contractors to wait for payment.
Long-term performance of asphalt pavement can be reliably
estimated after two or three years.
b. Variance of asphalt binder content is probably not a good measure
of quality of HMA pavement.
c. Performance should be based upon measurements taken from the
driving lane only. Bridges, off/on ramps, etc. should be excluded.
d. Payment should be based upon $/SY of materials placed during
construction instead of a percentage of the overall contract or tons
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of material emplaced. Payment should be proportional to the cost
of emplacing all layers (subgrade, base and wearing courses).
e. The NDOR contracts for more partial depth rehabilitation/
reclamation projects rather than full depth.

Researchers had

included full-depth replacement as a subcategory under traditional
asphalt. Proposed standards should be expanded to include all
rehabilitation projects.
f. Contractors would like to see a sample of flexible pavement
projects completed, NDOR’s assessment of quality of those
segments upon completion, and hypothetical payments contractors
would receive based upon proposed performance parameters
measured two or three years later.

3.2 NDOR Suggested Modifications
Researchers then met with NDOR representatives from Materials and
Research Division and Construction Division on December 1st, 2006. Comments
from the NDOR personnel present at that meeting included:
a. All asphalt pavement contracted by NDOR must now meet
Superpave specifications, so traditional asphalt as a category could
be deleted from the proposal.
b. A discussion was held on the proposed standards of quality,
specifically indicators for measuring pavement performance and
whether IRI is indicative of quality for asphalt pavement.

The

consensus was that IRI decreases as asphalt pavement ages, so
IRI is irrelevant for measuring long-term quality.
c. A similar discussion ensued reference cracking of asphalt
pavement. The consensus was that control of cracking is beyond
control of the contractor (at least for many applications of asphalt
pavement). Cracking may or may not be affected by quality of
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materials used or by “laydown” procedures.

It should not be

included as an indicator when measuring long-term pavement
performance.
d. Flushing was subsequently discussed.

Consensus was that

flushing is affected by quality and quantity of binder used.
However, flushing is not an indicator normally measured by the
NDOR.

The NDOR has no published standards concerning what

levels of flushing are acceptable and what levels are considered
excessive. Flushing in excess of 20% was thought to be excessive,
but how frequently a measurement of flushing should be obtained
for a given section of highway and method of documentation could
not be agreed upon. The intent of this incentive program is to
provide incentives only for factors which the contractor can directly
control during the construction process. Flushing may or may not
be under contractor control. Specific pavement segments will have
to be manually evaluated for flushing if flushing is included as a
proposed incentive.
e. Rutting was the only proposed standard judged to be acceptable
under a performance based incentive program. Six millimeters was
considered too high for the limit and two years was considered
insufficient time to measure performance. Consensus was reached
that three years and four millimeters or less of rutting were
acceptable standards of quality for a performance based incentive
program.
f. An extended discussion then took place on whether the NDOR
wished to have eligibility criteria listed or whether the only eligibility
criteria should be “selected by the NDOR”.

Consensus was that

the NDOR does not intend to apply these incentive standards to all
or even to a majority of asphalt paving projects.

Performance

based incentives will be applied selectively only to specific projects
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where the NDOR has a special interest in contracting for long-term
quality pavement.
g. Profilograph Pay Factor (PPF) and Material Pay Factor (MPF) were
thought to represent good composite estimates of initial pavement
quality.

Projects with below-average PPF and MPF would not

normally be eligible for performance-based incentives, so these
factors could be used as eligibility criteria.
h. Consensus was that the same incentive(s) should apply to all
asphalt pavement applications, whether new pavement, full or
partial depth reclamation, rehabilitation or overlay.
i. The NDOR requested that performance indicators shown in Table
10 be condensed to reflect only one row of flexible pavement, with
a standard of rutting < 4 mm measured at three years. Flushing
less than 20% was to be included in the final recommendation as
well. PPF and MPF > 100% should be listed as eligibility criteria.
The proposed payment be based upon the NDOR’s current practice
of paying for quantity of asphaltic concrete (in tons or Mg) placed
as surface layers, not as dollars per square yard (or per square
meter) as requested by the contractor’s representatives.

3.3 Analysis of Projects Where Materials and Workmanship Incentives
Were Paid
Researchers then sought to investigate whether projects awarded
incentives immediately after construction showed acceptable or better standards
for long-term performance. The NDOR was asked to provide data for asphaltic
concrete projects in excess of five miles in length, which had been constructed
during the past three years, where quality incentives had been paid for
smoothness and/or materials and workmanship upon completion of construction.
Three years provided time for post-construction performance to accumulate and
be measured while length in excess of five miles indicated a significant paving
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project.

Rational for the quality incentive specification rested upon the

assumption that a project which failed to earn an incentive for quality of
construction would probably not be an ideal candidate for good long-term
performance. Table 11 shows cost information concerning three asphalt paving
projects approximately three years old that received materials and workmanship
incentives from the NDOR for pavement quality. All projects involved Superpave
specifications for asphalt. Three different types of construction incentives were
paid for each project. Table 12 shows rutting measured for these three projects
over the first three years of their lifespan.

Table 11 - Projects Where Construction Incentives Were Paid
Control
Number
60937
31345
60893
60937
31345
60893
60937
31345
60893
60937
31345
60893

Smoothness
Additional
Quantity
Incentive
Incentive Pay
Incentive
Paid
Factor
Pay Factor
Smoothness Incentive - Performance Graded (PG) Binder
Not Available
$5.94
776.92 Mg
$4,614.92
104.06%
$6.46
522.08 Tons
$3,372.64
100.75%
$2.04
248.298 Mg
$506.03
Smoothness Incentive – Asphaltic Concrete
Not Available
$0.84980
17,544.60
$14,912.91
104.06%
$750000
12,733.75 Tons
$9,550.30
100.74%
$0.14800
4,281 Mg
$633.59
Superpave Quality Incentive (Air Voids)
Not Available
$0.90
51,729.62 Mg
$46,400.99
103.54%
$0.66
25,229.950 Tons $16,651.77
Not Available
$0.68
25,807.04 Mg
$17,419.75
Total Construction Quality Incentive Paid
$65,928.82
$29,574.71
$18,559.37
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Table 12 – Analysis of Pavement Performance Over Three Years

HWY

BEG
REF
POST
NUM

END
REF
POST
NUM

CNTRL
NUM

WRK
DESC

DT
COMP
LTD

AVG
RUT
D
2003

AVG
RUT
D
2004

AVG
RUT
D
2005

AVG
RUTD
2006

IRI
2006

CRK
NG
IDX

2002

0.75

1.43

1.6

2.4

0.8

1.7

4.6

0.9

0

1

5.5

2

258.04

270.32

60937

GR
CULV
RESURF
S-SHLD

30

114.31

124.31

60893

GR STR
RESURF

2003

0.3

3.39

3.58

275

31.91

39.31

31345

RESURF

2002

3.37

4.87

ND
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4.5

CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
Based upon the meeting with contractor representatives, the meeting the
NDOR’s Materials and Research Division and Construction Division personnel,
and analysis of information in Tables 11 and 12, a proposal for a performancebased incentive program for asphalt pavement was created and is summarized in
Table 13. Researchers initially intended to recommend a 5% incentive based
upon total cost of asphalt paving materials for the project.

However, the

incentive paid for construction quality varied on the three project analyzed from
3.7% to 5.7%. An incentive less than the construction quality incentive paid three
years in the future would appear to be of little interest to most contractors, so a
6% payment was recommended instead. Six percent is only a recommendation.
The actual percentage paid can be adjusted upward or downward by the NDOR
until the level of interest displayed by contractors is sufficient to satisfy the
NDOR’s needs.

Four millimeters of rutting during the first three years of

pavement life remains the recommended standard based upon meetings with
both contractor’s representatives and the NDOR.

Both the standard and/or the

time period can be adjusted upward or downward as needs or conditions change.

Table 13 – Proposed Performance Incentive(s) for Asphalt Pavement

Asphalt Pavement Performance
Eligibility Criteria

Incentive Standards

When Measured

rutting < 4 mm

3 yrs

Profilograph Pay Factor > 100%

~ 6 % of asphalt
pavement cost

flushing < 20%
Materials Pay Factor > 100%

Payment

of paved surface
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as determined
by the NDOR

Table 14 illustrates how the proposed performance based incentive would have
applied to the three projects analyzed in Tables 11 and 12. Two of the projects
would have been ineligible for the proposed performance based incentive as the
measured value for rutting exceeded the maximum level three years into the
pavement’s lifespan.

Table 14 – Application of Performance Incentive to Three Projects
Highway

Control

Total Cost

Distance

Average

Proposed

Number

Number

of Asphalt

(Miles)

Rutting at

Performance

3 Years

Incentives

Paving
2

60937

$1,150,566

12.28

1.6

$69,034

30

60893

$505,205

10

4.6

$0

275

31345

$494,595

7.4

> 4.5

$0

The proposed pavement performance incentive was never envisioned as
being applied to all projects but only to projects where the NDOR wishes the
resulting pavement to be of superior quality.

These situations might include

roads where the volume of traffic is sufficient to make repair and/or rehabilitation
exceedingly difficult or costly.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Results of this research can be used by NDOR to provide contractors with
incentives to more closely control the quality of materials used in mixes and
methods of construction for asphalt pavements. Percentages or time periods
associated with a specific incentive can be established by level of performance
desired and adjusted to encourage the desired level of contractor participation in
this process.
The performance incentive system proposed is designed to align the
objectives of paving contractors more closely with the objectives of the NDOR.
Under this system, both the NDOR and pavement contractors will be interested
in providing pavement that meets certain specifications upon completion of
construction and performs well enough to continue meeting established
standards for a period of time afterward. This system will highlight to contractors
the need to use quality materials and methods and will also provide a positive
financial incentive in later years for contractors who construct quality pavement.
A quality incentive program of this type based upon pavement
performance could become a nation-wide trend. Many state transportation
agencies are experimenting with pavement warranties, best value contracts and
performance based contracting procedures in an attempt to procure higher
quality pavement. A quality incentive program of the type proposed in this
research has the potential to provide most of the benefits of these three
programs at less than cost and certainly with less legal entanglements.
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